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PROPERTY: CONFLICTING CONSTRUCTIVE AND CIVIL
POSSESSIONS'
The Louisiana Civil Code articles concerning possession and ac-
quisitive prescription of immovable property were revised by Act 187
of 1982, effective January 1, 1983; but this revision did not change the
basic concepts of constructive or civil possession. Possession of part of
an immovable by virtue of a title is still deemed to be constructive
possession to the limits of that title, 2 while civil possession still allows
possession to be retained by the intent to possess as an owner even if
the possessor has ceased corporeal possession. 3 The revision also followed
the old law in another, less desirable, manner. Neither the old law nor
the revision provides rules governing conflicts between constructive and
civil possessions.' These conflicts arise in three basic instances: when
two constructive possessions overlap the same tract of land, when a
constructive possession overlaps a civil possession, and when two civil
possessions overlap.
Each of these three conflicts can be illustrated by reference to
diagram 1:1 In the first example, X and Y acquire title and enter into
simultaneous possession of tracts 1 and 2. X has title to tract 1 and
enters into corporeal possession in the Northwest quarter. This corporeal
possession of part of tract 1 gives X constructive possession of all of
tract 1. Y has title to tract 2, and he enters into corporeal possession
in the Southeast quarter. Y's corporeal possession of part of tract 2
gives him constructive possession of all of tract 2. The result is that
there are conflicting constructive possessions in the shaded portion of
the diagram. This example also applies to conflicts involving civil pos-
sessions. Under the same facts, suppose X ceases corporeal possession
* Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. In the whole range of legal theory there is no conception more difficult than
that of possession. The Roman lawyers brought their usual acumen to the
analysis of it, and since their day the problem has formed the subject of a
voluminous literature, while it still continues to tax the ingenuity of jurists. Nor
is the question one of mere curiosity or scientific interest, for its practical
importance is not less than its difficulty.
J. Salmond, Jurisprudence 293 (C. Manning 8th ed. 1930).
2. La. Civ. Code art. 3426; A. Yiannopoulos, Property § 212, at 556, in 2 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980).
3. La. Civ. Code art. 3431; 1 M. Planiol, Civil Law Treatise pt. 2, no. 2267, at
342 (12th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1939).
4. See Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes to the New Law of Possession and
Acquisitive Prescription, 44 La. L Rev. 69, 76, n.26 (1983).
5. See page 988 [hereinafter referred to as diagram 1].
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on tract 1 without intending to abandon ownership of the property. X's
remaining civil possession conflicts with Y's constructive possession. In
the final situation, if Y then ceases corporeal possession after X has
ceased corporeal possession, the shaded area will represent conflicting
civil possessions.
These conflicts are important in the context of both the possessory
and petitory actions. A possessory action is a contest of the right to
possess the land,6 while a petitory action involves an adjudication of
the ownership of land.7 Normally a conflict between two parties as to
possession and ownership of land will begin as a possessory action,
which is less complex than a petitory action." The winner of the pos-
sessory action is entitled to possession of the land. One important aspect
of possession is that it gives the possessor the benefit of the rebuttable
presumption that he is the owner of the land.9 This presumption will
become irrebuttable if the possessor retains possession long enough to
perfect a claim of 10 or 30 year acquisitive prescription. The loser of
the possessory action may attempt to prevent this by instituting a petitory
action. At this point the presumption of ownership provides strong
protection to the possessor. The non-possessing party has the burden
of proving his ownership which involves the often impossible task of
proving that he (the non-possessor) acquired ownership from a previous
owner or by acquisitive prescription. 0 Proving that the land was acquired
. 6. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3655-3662; A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 2, §§ 203-221,
at 544-92.
7. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3651-3654; A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 2, §§ 185-201,
at 497-541.
8. For example, the petitory action imposes a stronger burden of proof than the
possessory action. The actions also differ in regard to prerequisites and available relief.
See infra note 10.
9. "One is presumed to intend to possess as owner unless he began to possess in
the name of and for another." La. Civ. Code art. 3427. This article replaced OA 3488
which stated, "As to the fact itself of possession, a person is presumed to have possessed
as master and owner, unless it appears that the possession began in the name of and for
another." NA 3427 did not change the law.
10. Code of Civil Procedure article 3653 states:
To obtain a judgment recognizing his ownership of immovable property or real
right therein, the plaintiff in a petitory action shall: (1) Prove that he has
acquired ownership from a previous owner or by acquisitive prescription, if the
court finds that the defendant is in possession thereof; or (2) Prove a better
title thereto than the defendant, if the court finds that the latter is not in
possession thereof. When the title of the parties are traced to a common author,
he is presumed to be the previous owner.
Thus, the presumption of ownership given to the defendant who is in possession keeps
that defendant's title from being at issue until after the plaintiff has proven valid title
in himself or has proven acquisitive prescription. Schutten v. Orleans Parish Levee Dist.,
320 So. 2d 605 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 323 So. 2d 806 (La. 1976), Garrett
v. Ernest, 369 So. 2d 713 (La. App. Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 371 So. 2d 1340 (La. 1979).
NOTES
from a previous owner is difficult because it requires proving an un-
broken chain of owners back to the sovereign or an ancestor in title
in common with the possessor." Proving acquisitive prescription pre-
dating the possessor's possession presents the problem of finding ancient
evidence. In either event, the possessor enjoys a significant advantage
over the non-possessor. Resolving the problems of conflicting constructive
or civil possessions or both can thus be seen as a determination of
which party is to receive possession and the accompanying, important
presumption of ownership. This in turn may lead to a judicial deter-
mination of which party is the actual owner of the land.
The Louisiana Civil Code does not indicate which party is entitled
to possession or ownership in any of these situations, but the Louisiana
courts have addressed these problems on many occasions. 2 The Louisiana
jurisprudence on these conflicts is consistent, but the guidance offered
by the cases will not be equitable in all cases. This comment will examine
the state of the existing jurisprudence and recommend an analytical
framework for consistent and equitable future decisions.
The Underlying Property Theories
In order to analyze the problems resulting from conflicts involving
constructive or civil possessions or both, an understanding of the un-
derlying property theories is essential. The problems can be viewed as
the result of three interrelated concepts: (1) the requirement of notice
to create possession and begin acquisitive prescription, (2) the theory of
constructive possession whereby possession of part of a tract of land
under title equals possession of the whole tract, and (3) the theory of
civil possession or possession retained by intent.
Notice of Possession
A possessor is entitled to the rebuttable presumption that he is the
owner of the land. 3 This presumption benefits the possessor in two
ways, especially if he is not the true owner of the land. First, if he
11. This is because proving acquisition from a "previous owner" involves proving
that the "previous owner" was indeed an owner. Cf. Avery v. Nash, 448 So. 2d 841
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); Whitley v. Texaco, 434 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 435 So. 2d 445 (1983); Romby v. Zion Hill Baptist Church, 327 So. 2d 538 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1976).
12. See cases cited infra note 43.
13. Civil Code article 3423 states, "A possessor is considered provisionally as owner
of the thing he possess until the right of the true owner is established." Civil Code article
3427 states, "One is presumed to intend to possess as owner unless he began to possess
in the name of and for another."
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retains possession for one year he obtains the right to possess the land. 4
As a result, his possession can only be judicially contested in a petitory
action, and (as previously discussed) the presumption of ownership gives
the possessor strong evidentiary advantages in this action.' 5 Secondly,
if the possessor retains possession for the statutory period necessary to
perfect a claim of acquisitive prescription, the presumption of ownership
will become irrebuttable. 6 In either instance, the possessor is taking
valuable rights from the true owner. The true owner loses these rights
by failing to exercise timely his ownership by ousting the adverse pos-
sessor. An owner who fails to exercise these rights for the statutory
period is presumed to have acquiesced to the adverse possessor's own-
ership. 7 But the true owner cannot be presumed to have acquiesed to
an adverse claim when he has no knowledge of that claim.' 8 Public
policy will not allow an adverse possessor to surreptitiously take land
from the true owner without giving the owner fair notice that his rights
are being contested. '9 The law presumes that landowners maintain diligent
14. La. Civ. Code art. 3422; Pitre v. Tenneco Oil Co., 385 So. 2d 840 (La. App.
1st Cir.), cert. denied, 392 So. 2d 678 (La. 1980).
15. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. These evidentiary advantages may be
insurmountable in many instances. Failure to meet these difficult evidentiary requirements
would, in essence, allow the possessor to perfect his claim of acquisitive prescription
without judicial challenge from the plaintiff.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 3446.
17. Pitre v. Tenneco Oil Co., 385 So. 2d at 846.
18. In the same way that prescription liberandi causa is founded upon a pre-
sumption of payment, prescription acquirendi causa is founded upon a pre-
sumption of acquiescence on the part of the owner in the claim of title set up
by the possessor; and the owner of property cannot be presumed to have
acquiesced in a claim of ownership of which he is in total ignorance.
John T. Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan's La. & T. R. & S.S. Co., 126 La. 839, 879,
53 So. 22, 35 (1908); 28 G. Baudry-Lacantinerie & A. Tissier, Traite Theorique et Pratique
de Droit Civil § 257, at 138 (4th ed. 1924), in 5 Civil Law Translations (J. Mayda trans.
1972); Pitre v. Tenneco Oil Co., 385 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 392
So. 2d 678 (La. 1980). This presumption of acquiescence is a fiction. An alternative
method of stating this same concept is that an owner who has failed to exercise ownership
or surveillance rights for 10 or 30 years has been so negligent in developing his property
that it seems equitable to transfer ownership of that property to a possessor who has
developed it during that long period. Although both the acquiescence and negligence
theories can be used to justify the concept of acquisitive prescription, a more likely
justification may be the desire to bar ancient claims. In this respect, the possessor is
protected from claims to his land which he would have difficulty in defending because
of the problems of locating evidence over 10 or 30 years old.
19. La. Civ. Code arts. 3435-3436; Comment, Elementary Considerations in the
Commencement of Prescription on Immovable Property, 12 Tul. L. Rev. 608, 611 n.14
(1938). "The [notice] requirement rests on the policy judgment that existing rights in land
should not be lost without the owner's being put on guard sufficiently to enable him to
take preventative action by acting with reasonable promptness." 7 R. Powell, The Law
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surveillance of their land. Therefore, in order to obtain the benefits of
the presumption of ownership or acquisitive prescription, the adverse
possessor must prove that he has exercised acts of ownership on the
land that would be sufficient to put a reasonably prudent landowner on
notice of an adverse claim.2
The Theory of Constructive Possession
A landowner who corporeally possesses part of an immovable under
a title is deemed to have constructive possession to the limits of his
title;2' thus, constructive possession can be viewed as a legal fiction.
The actual possession of the landowner is extended by creation of law
to the limits of his paper title.22
A paradox is involved in this legal fiction. In conjunction with
corporeal possession of part of a tract of land, a title must be used to
define the limits of the constructive possession. A recorded title represents
a disturbance in law; 23 yet, a disturbance in law does not give notice
of the titled claim. 2 Thus, while the recorded title can be used to prove
of Real Property § 1013[2][b] (1982). Cf. Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 864, 442 P.2d
692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1968) (requirement of notice from surface estate owner claiming
possession of severed mineral estate to owner of the mineral estate.)
20. 28 G. Baudry-Lacantinerie & A. Tissier, supra note 18, §§ 258 & 260, at 139;
When a possessor is actually in possession of the disputed property, the re-
quirement of notoriety is normally met, whether or not the owner actually knows
of the possession. When he does not in fact know of the possession, the actuality
of the possession is commonly treated as "notice", satisfying the requirement.
What a duly alert owner would have known, the owner is charged with knowing.
7 R. Powell, supra note 19, § 1013[2][b], at 91-14; "Actual knowledge of the possession
on the part of the true owner is not, however, necessary, it being sufficient that he could
have learned thereof by the exercise of proper diligence." 4 H. Tiffany, The Law of
Real Property § 1140, at 727 (3d ed. 1975). Tiffany also suggests that there is an exception
to this general rule;
"There are, however, statements to be found that notoriety of possession is not
necessary in case the possession is actually known to the rightful owner, statements
which suggest, by implication, that there might be a possession sufficient to satisfy
the requirement of actual possession, but not sufficient to satisfy that of visible
and notorious possession."
Id. at 728.
21. La. Civ. Code art. 3426; A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 2, § 212, at 566; Donegan's
Heirs v. Martineau, 9 Mart. (o.s.) 43 (La. 1820); 7 G. Powell, supra note 19, § 1013[2][g],
at 91-39.
22. A contrario, in the absence of title one has possession only of the area he actually
possesses. La. Civ. Code arts. 3426 & 3487.
23. La. Code Civ. P. art 3659; A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 2, § 216, at 581.
24. A man who is in the quiet and peacable possession and enjoyment of his
property does not have to be inspecting the public records every day, or every
month or every year, or, for the matter of that every 10 or 30 years, to find
out if somebody has not been recording title to his property. Until his possession
is disturbed he does not have to concern himself with any claims that other
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 45
the extent of the land claimed, that title alone is inadequate to give
notice that an adverse claim is being actively asserted. The significance
of this paradox is that the legal fiction of constructive possession does
not give notice sufficient to begin possession or acquisitive prescription.
The Theory of Civil Possession
Two things are necessary to acquire possession: corporeal detention
of the thing (corpus) and the intent to possess as owner (animus).25
Once acquired, possession is retained by mere animus, even if the
possessor ceases to possess corporeally. This is the concept of civil
possession.
26
The policy justification underlying the concept of civil possession is
that it promotes title stability by allowing persons to retain possession
without requiring continuous acts of corporeal possession. This in turn
makes the rights of ownership perpetual since even an absentee owner
can continually assert his rights as against third parties. 27 This policy
of title stability is evidenced by a change in the law in the 1982 revision
of the Civil Code. Old article 3444 provided the rebuttable presumption
that a possessor intended to retain civil possession after ceasing corporeal
possession. This presumption had a maximum duration of ten years.2 8
people may be recording against his property. Registry is for the benefit of
those who wish to contract with reference to property-to inform them of the
condition of the title to the property with reference to which they are about
to contract, and was never designed to operate as a means of disturbing or
ousting the possession of the owner of the property.
John T. Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan's La. & T. R. & S. S. Co., 126 La. 839, 879,
53 So. 22, 35 (1908); Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Lemoine, 381 So. 2d 915 (3d Cir.
1980).
25. La. Civ. Code art. 3424; 28 G. Baudry-Lacantinerie & A. Tissier, supra note 18,
§ 214, at 118; 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3, no. 2267, at 342; 2 C. Aubry & C. Rau,
Droit Civil Francais § 179, at 85 (P. Esmein 7th ed. 1961), in 2 Civil Law Translations
(J. Mayda trans. 1966).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 3431; 1 M. Planiol, supra note 3, no. 2274, at 346; 28 G.
Baudry-Lacantinerie & A. Tissier, supra note 18, § 228, at 124; A. Yiannopoulos, supra
note 2, § 211, at 564; Ellis v. Prevost, 19 La. 251 (1841).
27. Note, Working With the New Civil Code Property Scheme: The 1982 Book III
Revision, 43 La. L. Rev. 1079 (1983). Cf. Comment, The Ten-Year Acquisitive Prescription
of Immovables, 36 La. L. Rev. 1000 (1976) (arguing that stability of title is a purpose
underlying concept of acquisitive prescription).
28. Old article 3444 stated:
To retain the possession of a thing when a man once has it, it is not even
necessary that he should have such positive intention; a negative intention
suffices, that is, it suffices that the positive intention, which he had in acquiring
the possession, shall not have been revoked by a contrary intention; for, so
long as this revocation does not take place, the possessor is supposed always
to retain his first intention, unless a third person has usurped or taken from
him possession, or he has' failed to exercise an actual possession for ten years.
NOTES
The revision eliminated this limitation 29 and now civil possession can
continue indefinitely. This change in the law will have two relevant
effects: first, it can be said that all land in Louisiana that has ever
been corporeally possessed is now at least civilly possessed;30 second,
possession can no longer be lost by non-use.3'
Loss of Possession32
With the repeal of the ten year limitation on civil possession, losses
of constructive, civil, and corporeal possession are now all handled by
article 3433 which states that possession can be lost by abandonment,
or by eviction by force or usurpation.13 Whether an eviction by force
or usurpation has occurred is a question of fact which depends upon
the circumstances of each case.34 Declaring that an issue is a question
of fact gives minimal guidance in a determination of what constitutes
loss of possession, and thus article 3433 is no more than a starting
point. Since article 3433 is now the only article covering loss of con-
structive, civil, and corporeal possessions, it can be argued that the
same standard of ouster is applicable to each type of possession. This
view has been criticized as overly simplistic. 3 Arguments have been
advanced in favor of the application of two different factual standards
29. Old article 3444 was replaced by article 3432 which states, "The intent to retain
possession is presumed unless there is clear proof of a contrary intention." While the
elimination of the ten year limit on civil possession is technically a change in the law,
the effect of this change is minimized by the fact that the Louisiana courts had not
strictly applied OA 3444. See Note, supra note 27, at 1087 and Symeonides, supra note
4, at 79 n.30.
30. See Symeonides, supra note 4, at 79 n.30.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 3432, comment (c). See also Symeonides, supra note 4, at
79 n.30.
32. Except in the case of abandonment, any discussion of how one party loses
possession is necessarily a discussion of how another party has gained possession. Thus,
a discussion of what level of disturbance will cause a person to lose a certain type of
possession is implicitly a discussion of what level of acts an adverse claimant must maintain
to oust that type of possession.
33. "Possession is lost when the possessor manifests his intention to abandon it or
when he is evicted by another by force or usurpation." La. Civ. Code art. 3433; Note,
supra note 27, at 1088. A possible exception to the statement that article 3433 governs
all losses of possession may be found in article 3432. This article allows civil possession
to be lost by proof of an intent contrary to the intent to possess as owner under article
3431. But this can best be described as a particularized form of abandonment which
eliminates it as an exception to the statement that article 3433 governs loss of all pos-
sessions. See also the comments following article 3433.
34. La. Civ. Code art. 3433, comment (d); Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration
Co., 319 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975); 4 H. Tiffany, supra note 20, § 1143, at 755.
35. Symeonides, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Property, 44 La. L. Rev. 505,
513 (1983).
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under article 3433: one governing loss of constructive possession and
the other governing loss of corporeal possession.36 This distinction would
require the application of a higher factual standard to determine whether
corporeal possession has been lost than would be required in a similar
determination regarding loss of constructive possession, i.e., it will take
more to defeat a corporeal possession than to defeat a constructive posses-
sion. This is a sound distinction, but the matter may be complicated by
the inclusion of civil possession in this dual standard.
In ascertaining how civil possession fits under this bifurcated article
3433 standard, a logical distinction can be drawn between corporeal
possession and both civil and constructive possession. Corporeal pos-
session involves both corpus and animus3 7 because the possessor is phys-
ically on the land with the intent to possess as the owner. In this case
the corpus evidences the corporeal possessor's animus. The possessor's
intent to possess can be ascertained by looking at the land. In contrast
to this physical reality involved in the notion of corporeal possession,
the concepts of civil possession and constructive possession can both be
viewed as legal fictions based upon the animus. With constructive pos-
session, a title describes the geographical extent of the land which the
owner intends to possess, and his possession is extended by the title to
the limits of that animus. With civil possession no physical requirements
exist since animus alone is sufficient to retain possession. Thus, unlike
corporeal possession, neither constructive nor civil possession is evidenced
by physical activity on the land.
On the basis of this distinction, civil possession and constructive
possession should fit together under the dual standard of article 3433.
A third standard under article 3433 is unnecessary because of the similarly
intangible nature of both civil and constructive possessions."s The result
36. Id.
37. 2 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 25, § 179, at 85; 1 M. Planiol, supra note
3, no. 2267, at 342.
38. Besides not being necessary, it may not be desirable to have a different factual
standard as between ouster of civil and constructive possessions. A simple example will
demonstrate the problems involved in such a distiction. In diagram 1, assume that X has
title to tract I and is in corporeal possession in the Northwest Quarter. His corporeal
possession of part of the land gives him constructive possession of the entire tract. Y
has title to tract 2 and is in corporeal possession in the Southeast Quarter. Y's corporeal
possession on part of the land gives him constructive possession of all of tract 2. The
result is conflicting constructive possession in the shaded area. Now assume the largest
possible difference in factual standards between ouster of civil and constructive possession;
constructive possession can oust civil possession. X now ceases corporeal possession of
tract 1, but retains civil possession. Y's current constructive possession instantly ousts X's
civil possession as to the shaded area. Without any notice to X, Y has taken a portion
of land under X's title. Any other difference in factual standard between ouster of civil
[Vol. 45
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is a factual standard for ascertaining loss of corporeal possession and
a reduced factual standard for ascertaining loss of both constructive
and civil possession.
The Conflicts
Although the three underlying theories discussed above are ade-
quately set forth in the Civil Code, the Code does not provide an equally
sufficient explanation of how the theories interact. This shortcoming is
often illuminated in cases involving disputes between parties claiming
the same tract of land. In these cases, each party believes he owns the
disputed tract, and this belief may exist for a great many years before
the conflict is even discovered. The reason these conflicts can go un-
discovered for long periods explains precisely why the problems arise
in the first place. Essentially, the problem is caused by the intangible
nature of both constructive and civil possession.
As previously discussed, corporeal possession involves both corpus
and animus.3 9 The corpus (or physical aspect),makes corporeal possession
obvious and notorious. For example, lights on in houses, cars in drive-
ways, and fences around inhabited lots generally indicate an obvious
possession. These corporeal aspects of the possession make it identifiable,
thus giving notice of its existence. In contrast, civil and constructive
possession rarely give notice to the world of their existence. These legal
fictions are not evidenced on the land itself-in fact, their purpose is
to avoid a requirement that possession of land be at all times corporeal
in nature.
The significance of this failure of both constructive and civil pos-
sessions to give notice can be illustrated by the situation represented in
diagram 1. Assume that X acquires title to tract 1 and enters into
corporeal possession in the Northwest quarter, thus giving X constructive
possession of all of tract 1. Y acquires title to tract 2 and enters into
corporeal possession in the Southeast quarter, thus giving Y constructive
possession of all of tract 2. The shaded area represents conflicting
constructive possessions, 4° but the conflict is not discovered for fifteen
years at which time one of the parties brings a petitory or possessory
action. Assuming that X acquired possession first, X will claim that Y
and constructive possessions will allow the same result: parties will be able to oust prior
possessions without any notice: Such a loss of possession without any notice should be
prevented.
39. See supra note 37.
40. Note that since the same standard of ouster or loss of possession is applicable
to both constructive and civil possessions under article 3433 the two types of possession
are effectively interchangeable at this point in the hypothetical. The shaded area can
represent conflicting constructive possessions, conflicting civil possessions, or both.
19851
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never gave him notice of Y's adverse claim to the shaded area and that
X has acquired the tract by acquisistive prescription. It seems unfair to
allow Y to acquire land previously constructively possessed by X without
notice to X. 4 1 But assume that Y is actually the owner of the land and
that X acquired title from someone who did not own tract 1. In this
instance, X is clandestinely taking land which rightfully belongs to Y.
X's preexisting constructive possession is not ousted by Y's constructive
possession. Although Y is the true owner of the land, his possession
has been limited by X's prior possession even though Y had no notice
of such a limitation on his possession. 42 Strong equitable arguments can
be made in favor of each party, even in this simple example. Although
equitable solutions are possible for conflicts involving similar fact pat-
terns, a remaining problem is determining whether that judicial solution
can be equitably applied to other cases as a guiding principle.
41. The result is that Y cannot constructively possess the shaded area because this
would be a dispossession of X without notice to X. However, Y is not completely deprived
of the right to constructively possess land under his title. Y may constructively (or civilly)
possess tract 2 in all areas not possessed by X. The limit on Y's constructive possession
is merely a limitation on Y's ability to oust a prior possession by asserting his own
constructive possession. See infra note 47 in regards to the problem of concurrent possession
by two possessors.
42. While X may, in effect, be clandestinely limiting Y's possession, Y has given no
notice to X of his second encroaching possession. X can equitably argue that he should
be entitled to the benefit of the full extent of his constructive possession for purposes




The Louisiana courts have faced the above issues on many occa-
sions. 4 An example of the consistent reasoning used by the courts in
cases where they have squarely faced this issue is given by Ernest Realty
Co. v. Hunter Co." In this case, a common author deeded the same
small tract of land (Lot 4) to two separate vendees under two deeds of
larger tracts of land. The defendant was in corporeal possession of part
of the land which gave him constructive possession of Lot 4 under the
senior deed dated June 9, 1906. The plaintiff also had constructive
possession of Lot 4 by virtue of corporeal possession of part of the
land under the junior deed dated February 20, 1907. Neither party was
in corporeal possession of any part of Lot 4.45
In resolving this conflicting constructive possession issue, the court
began with a common presumption: there cannot be two possessions at
the same time of the same property. 6 This case, like other cases that
begin with this presumption, does not give any rationale for this pre-
sumption. The reasoning is apparently rooted in the desire to prevent
potential uncertainty in land titles. If two parties were allowed to possess
the same land at the same time, both would benefit from the presumption
that they were the owner of the land. Accordingly, each possessor would
be entitled to obtain the right to possess the land after one year and
to eventually perfect a claim of acquisitive prescription. Allowing such
concurrent possession could require the courts to decide which party is
entitled to retain their concurrently perfected claim of either the right
to possess or acquisitive prescription. Allowing one such perfected claim
43. The long line of Louisiana jurisprudence on this issue is represented by the
following cases: Gilmore v. Schenck, 115 La. 386, 39 So. 40 (1905); John T. Moore
Planting Co. v. Morgan's La. & T. R. & S.S. Co., 126 La. 839, 53 So. 22 (1908);
Chicago, St. L. & N.O. Ry. Co. v. Town of Amite City, 136 La. 742, 67 So. 814 (1915);
Smith v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 219 La. 982, 54 So. 2d 421 (1951); Crain v. Graves,
177 So. 2d 189 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Downs v. McNeal, 193 So. 2d 843 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967); Gaulter v. Gennaro, 345 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Whitley v.
Texaco, 434 So. 2d 96, 107 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982). The consistency of this jurisprudence
is illustrated by the fact that the holding in Whitley v. Texaco was based upon a quotation
from Gilmore v. Schenck.
44. 189 La. 379, 179 So. 460 (1933).
45. One should note that the facts of this case are easily reducible to the parameters
of the simple examples used previously.
46. It is a well settled and established principle of law that where the legal and
rightful owner of a tract of land has actual possession of a part thereof, he is
in legal and constructive possession of the whole, except such portion thereof
that may be in the actual possession and occupancy, by inclosure or otherwise,
of a party claiming either by title under article 3478 or thirty years' adverse
possession, article 3499. The reason for this rule is that both cannot have
constructive possession.
Ernest Realty Co. v. Hunter Co., 189 La. 379, 384, 179 So. 460, 461 (1938).
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to supersede another equally perfected claim would destroy the title
stability benefits of both possession and acquisisitve prescription. There-
fore, in order to preserve title stability, the law prohibits concurrent
possessions. 47 Once this prohibition is established as the starting point
47. This prohibition on concurrent possession of the same land is needed to preserve
logical consistency under the current framework of the Civil Code. The following example
demonstrates this need. In diagram 1 assume X acquires tract I in 1979 under valid title,
but that the title is defective in that the vendor did not really own tract 1. X enters into
corporeal possession of the Northwest quarter, which gives him constructive possession
of the entire tract. Y acquires tract 2 as a good faith possessor under just title in 1980,
entitling Y to the potential benefits of ten year acquisitive prescription. Y's corporeal
possession in the Southeast quarter of tract 2 gives him constructive possession of all of
tract 2. The shaded area represents conflicting constructive possessions. Assume this conflict
is not discovered until 1985 at which time Y wins a petitory action affirming his ownership
-of the shaded tract. The problem is that prior to the date of this judgment, X had been
possessing the shaded area as the first possessor. Y's constructive possession of the shaded
area was prevented by X's prior possession. Theoretically, Y has 5 years worth of possession
towards acquisitive prescription of tract 2, except as to the shaded area where his possession
did not begin until 1985. This difference in Y's length of possession could be significant
if Y is called upon to defend his title in the years between 1990 and 1995 and Y must
do so by proof of acquisitive prescription.
There are three possible solutions to this problem, but all three solutions will be logically
inconsistent with existing law. The first solution, as previously discussed, is to allow con-
current possession. But this solution is logically flawed in that the conflicting claims may
not be discovered until after both possessors have concurrently perfected claims to the land
by acquisitive prescription. Allowing one party to defeat another party's perfected claim
of acquisitive prescription with a concurrent claim of acquisitive prescription will destroy
the title stability benefits of the prescription doctrine by destroying the ability to rely thereon.
An alternative solution is to grant Y retroactive possession of the shaded tract effective
back to the day when Y first established constructive or civil possession of tract 2. But
this would in essence allow Y's constructive possession to have ousted X's constructive posses-
sion. This sort of dispossession is not consistent with the fact that X could have acquired
the tract by prescription if Y had not timely challenged his possession. Allowing Y to retroac-
tively dispossess X only if X has not perfected a claim of acquisitive prescription to the
tract may provide a solution to this inconsistency, but any use of retroactive possessions
invites an undesired measure of complicity into the matter. For example, the companion
issue of accession promises to be particularly difficult when dealt with retroactively.
A third solution was flirted with by the fifth circuit in Whitley v. Texaco, Inc., 434
So. 2d 96 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983). On original hearing the court stated that conflicting
constructive possessions "offset" each other. Two possessions cancel each other out, depriving
either party of the benefits of possession. Such an "offset" also allows the second possessor's
constructive possession to oust the first possessor's constructive possession. On rehearing
the court wisely abandoned this "offset" concept, and held that the first constructive possessor
was entitled to retain his possession until ousted. The second possessor's constructive possession
did not oust the first possession. Allowing the first possessor to retain possession until ousted
is the most logically consistent result under the framework of the current Civil Code. See
Symeonides, supra note 35, at 514.
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of the court's rationale, the ultimate solution is practically inevitable.
The first possessor becomes the sole possessor, unless he is ousted by
the second possessor. The second possessor's constructive possession does
not oust the first possession. 41 Once the first possessor acquires the right
to possess, the second possessor must resort to a petitory action and
challenge the first possessor with a claim of true title and ownership.
In Ernest Realty Co. the defendant prevailed by virtue of his senior
title from the common author, and this decision is typical of other such
cases .41
Effects of These Decisions
Although these decisions initially appear reasonable and just, the
holdings may cause several undesirable effects. These effects in turn
may result in inequities under different factual circumstances.
48. The second possessor's constructive possession does not give notice of the second
possessor's claim, and thus cannot oust the first possessor. See text accompanying notes
21-24.
49. Common law jurisdictions have reached the same result via the same reasoning.
The following is a representative sample of the United States Supreme Court's handling
of this matter:
It is true that when a person enters upon unoccupied land, under a deed or
title, and holds adversely, his possession is construed to be coextensive with his
deed or title, and the true owner will be deemed to be disseised to the extent
of the boundaries described in that title. Still, his possession beyond the limits
of his actual occupancy is only constructive. If the true owner be at the same
time in actual possession of part of the land, claiming title to the whole, he
has constructive possession of all the land not in the actual possession of the
intruder, and this, though the owner's actual possession is not within the limits
of the defective title. "The reason is plain. Both parties cannot be siesed at
the same time of the same land under different titles. The law, therefore,
adjudges the seisin of all that is not in the actual occupancy of the adverse
party to him who has the better title." These distinctions are clearly shown in
the cases. One who enters upon the land of another, though under color of
title, gives no notice to that other of any claim, except to the extent of his
actual occupancy. The true owner may not know the extent of the defective
title asserted against him, and if while he is actual possession of part of the
land, claiming title to the whole, mere constructive possession of another, of
which he has no notice, can oust him from that part of which he is not in
actual possession, a good title is no better than one which is a mere pretence.
Such, we think, is not the law.
Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U.S. 333, 368-69 (1880).
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The first result apparent from the cases is that the courts perceive
that equities generally favor the first possessor.50 The first possessor can
only be dispossessed by a timely challenge5 from a person who suc-
cessfully claims that he is the true owner of the land. Thus the first
possessor receives the benefit of all three of the underlying theories
previously discussed. He is entitled to benefit from the legal fictions of
constructive and civil possession unless he receives adequate notice of
an adverse claim.
The second possessor does not receive the benefit of these property
theories. His constructive or civil possessions cannot exist as against a
prior possessor, regardless of whether the second possessor has notice
of such a restriction on his possession. 2 The prior possession prevents
the second possessor from receiving these benefits, and the result is that
the second possessor is limited to acquisitive prescription by inch-by-
inch corporeal possession. 3
In cases similar to Ernest Realty Co., the holdings in favor of the
first possessor are fair. When neither party is in corporeal possession
of the tract in conflict, neither party has given notice to the other party
of an adverse claim. It is consistent with the title stability policy un-
derlying these problems to continue the first possessor's possession and
claim of ownership to the land unless the challenger can prove that he
is the true owner of the land. To hold otherwise would be to promote
the clandestine taking of land by the second possessor, or by the first
possessor in the case where he is not the true owner.
The Exception for Partial Corporeal Encroachment
There are cases in which the general rules stated above will seemingly
result in inequitable holdings. For example, assume X has title to the
tract in diagram 214 and moves into corporeal possession of the house
in the Southeast quarter. X's corporeal possession of the house in the
fenced area gives him constructive possession of the entire tract. Now
50. Cf. 5 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property § 2543
(1979).
51. A "timely" challenge is a challenge asserted before the adverse possessor acquires
the right to possess, La. Civ. Code art. 3422, or acquires the land by 10 year acquisitive
prescription, La. Civ. Code art. 3473, or 30 year acquisitive prescription, La. Civ. Code
art. 3486.
52. See e.g., Gilmore v. Schenck, 115 La. 386, 39 So. 40 (1905); Downs v. McNeal,
193 So. 2d 843 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); 7 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property §
1013[21[g] (1982).
53. Thus his situation is analogous to the situation of a possessor without title under
Civil Code article 3426: "In the absence of title, one has possession only of the area he
actually possesses."; see 4 H. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 1155 (1975).




assume X ceases corporeal possession by moving away, but retains civil
possession of the entire tract. Y acquires title to the entire tract from
a vendor other than X and moves into corporeal possession of the
house. Y corporeally possesses within the fenced area and has ousted
X as to that portion of the tract. But under the holdings of the above
cases, Y would not benefit from the concept of constructive possession
due to X's existing civil possession and, thus, Y is limited to inch-by-
inch corporeal possession." X retains possession, without notice to Y,
of all. land outside' the fenced area.5 6 The smaller the lot is, the more
onerous the result becomes.
It seems unfair to limit Y's possession in such a manner, especially
without notice to Y of the imposition of such a restriction. But there
is a significant difference between this hypothetical situation and those
discussed previously. Y's corporeal possession encroaches on a part of
the disputed tract in such a manner that it may be said to have given
notice of the adverse claim to X. This distinction should result in an
exception to the rule formulated in the prior cases.
An analogy to the California Supreme Court case Gerhard v.
Stephens" provides an explanation of this exception. In Gerhard, the
conflict was between owners of a surface estate and owners of a mineral
estate; the court applied California state law to resolve the issue. Al-
though, an analogy could be drawn between the California law and
55. As to why Y's current constructive possession should generally not oust X's civil
possession, see supra note 38. It will' be argued below that this situation represents an
exception to this general rule.
56. This example represents an extreme possibility. The same problem would exist in
the prior examples if Y had fenced in a portion of the shaded conflicting constructive
possession tract, as discussed infra text accompanying note 73.
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Louisiana law,58 the case is being used here primarily for its analytical
organization and focus. The logical framework provided by the case
emphasizes the significance of the notice requirement in resolving disputes
between conflicting estates. This focus on notice, as shall be explained
below, is the equitable foundation for the partial corporeal encroachment
exception.
In Gerhard, the plaintiffs owned a severed mineral estate and sued
to quiet title as against acts by the defendants who owned the surface
estate. The defendants claimed, among other things, that they had
acquired the mineral estate by adverse possession, both by surface activity
and the drilling of a dry hole on an adjacent tract. In an opinion by
Justice Tobriner, the California court held that the defendant surface
owners could not claim adverse possession of the minerals without giving
notice of such claim to the plaintiffs. This notice would have to be in
the form of a well drilled into the plaintiff's mineral estate-a corporeal
encroachment. "The California cases hold that a person in actual pos-
session of only a part of the land to which he has color of title cannot
establish ownership of the entire tract by adverse possession unless his
actual possession infringes upon the presumptive possession of the true
owners of the land." '59
A comparison should be -ade between the two estates in Gerhard
and the two estates in the preceding hypothetical examples. As discussed
previously, in the Ernest Realty Co. situation the second possessor's
constructive or civil possession of the disputed tract is ineffective as
against the first possessor's constructive or civil possession. This is
because the second possessor's intangible possession does not provide
notice of his claim. 6° But as illustrated by the Gerhard analogy, a
corporeal encroachment onto the disputed tract by the second possessor
may give the necessary notice to enable the second possessor to perfect
his claim. Recognition of this corporeal encroachment exception raises
two additional issues: the sufficiency of notice supplied by this corporeal
encroachment and the extent of the possession based on that encroach-
ment.
57. 68 Cal. 2d 864, 442 P.2d 692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1968).
58. The California civilian-based property law contains several similarities with Lou-
isiana law. See generally 2 Cal. Jur. 3d Adverse Possession §§ 1-82 (1973); 51 Cal. Jur.
3d Property §§ 6-12 (1979). A more specific example is California Code of Civil Procedure
section 322 which discusses the theory of constructive possession in the law of adverse
possession.
59. Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 902, 442 P.2d 692, 721, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612,
641 (1968).
60. See supra notes 47-51.
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Sufficiency of Notice From Partial Corporeal Encroachment
As previously discussed, notice is required to begin the running of
acquisitive prescription. 6' In the absence of notice, the adverse claim
can be considered clandestine and, thus, will not be given effect. 62
Whether notice is sufficient to begin acquisitive prescription is a question
of fact which depends on the circumstances of each particular case. 63
Although a study of the sufficiency of notice is beyond the scope of
this paper, 64 the notice requirement is generally satisfied when the facts
allow the raising of a presumption that a diligent landowner would have
known of the adverse claim. 6 A prudent landowner should exercise his
possession with sufficient diligence to prevent persons from taking his
property by acquisitive prescription. A corporeal encroachment onto
property will seemingly provide sufficient notice of an adverse claim in
most cases. 6
6
Extent of the Possession
Assuming sufficient notice, the next issue is a determination of the
extent of the possession resulting from that notice. As acknowledged
by the Gerhard case, the corporeal encroachment can be viewed in two
ways.
First, under the view consistent with the cases discussed above, 67
the second possessor is not given the benefit of the legal fictions of
either constructive or civil possessions due to the existence of a prior
possession. The second possessor's possession is limited to that land
which he possesses corporeally. To carry the Gerhard analogy one step
further, this has been the rationale used in several cases involving con-
flicting claims between surface and mineral estates.68 In these cases,
subsurface activity by the surface owner did not give title by constructive
possession to the entire mineral estate. This ruling can be justified in
61. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
62. La. Civ. Code arts. 3435-3436.
63. See supra note 34.
64. For more detailed discussions of the factual sufficiency of notice, see Comment,
Elementary Considerations in the Commencement of Prescription on Immovable Property,
12 Tul. L. Rev. 608 (1938); Comment, Notice as an Element of Adverse Possession, 7
Baylor L. Rev. 234 (1955).
65. See supra note 20.
66. "It cannot be held as a matter of law that the enclosure and cultivation of a
field of one acre on a large tract of land is not sufficient possession and use to put the
owner of the land on notice." 2 Tex. Jur. 3d, Adverse Possession § 182, at page 594.
67. See supra note 43.
68. E.g., Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., 256 Ala. 280 (1951); Piney Oil & Gas
Co. v. Scott, 258 Ky. 51, 79 S.W.2d 394 (Ky. Ct. App. 1934).
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a case involving conflicting surface estate claims on the ground that a
landowner may acquiesce in a slight encroachment, but by acquiescing
to that minor encroachment he should not be held to have acquiesced
to a greater constructive encroachment. Under this view the corporeal
encroachment is not notice of any larger claim. 69
This rule seems overly harsh to the second possessor. The first
possessor has acquiesced in a corporeal encroachment, but has retained
constructive or civil possession of the remainder of the disputed tract.
The second possessor believes that his corporeal encroachment has sup-
plied notice of his claim, and since he has no notice of the first
possessor's existing constructive or civil possession, he has no incentive
to further exert his claim. Between the parties, only the second possessor
has overcome the primary deficiency of an encroaching civil or con-
structive possession because only the second possessor has given notice
of any claim to the disputed tract. As such, the second possessor should
receive the benefits of constructive and civil possession. Under the Ger-
hard analogy, several cases have held that "development of part of the
subsurface estate under color of title to the entire tract will mature a
prescriptive title to the entire mineral estate." 70 Under this rationale, an
adverse corporeal encroachment by a second possessor onto the estate
of the first possessor should result in a duty on the first possessor to
investigate and ascertain the true extent of the adverse claim."
Thus, when the second possessor has a corporeal possession which
encroaches partially onto the land of another, the second possessor has
given notice that he is making an adverse claim to the prior possessor's
land. Once the notice requirement has been met,7 2 the second possessor
should be entitled to benefit from the legal fictions of civil and con-
structive possession. In this instance, the second possessor is entitled to
benefit from the presumption that he is the owner of the land, and he
should be entitled to acquire by acquisitive prescription to the extent
of his title on the basis of presumed or actual acquiescence by the prior
possessor to the adverse claim.
The equities of this exception are demonstrated by the following
example. In figure 3,73 assume X acquires title to tract 1 and enters
69. Thus, there can never be any "constructive disseisin." 5 G. Thompson, supra
note 50, § 2545, at 615.
70. Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 901, 442 P.2d 692, 720, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612,
640 (1968) (citations omitted).
71. An example is provided by Texas law. A partial encroachment is notice to the
true owner of the character and extent of the claim, and the true owner is charged with
the fact that a deed is on record. 2 Tex. Jur. 3d Adverse Possession § 166 (1979).
72. It must be remembered that this is a question of factual sufficiency. See supra
note 64.
73. See page 997.
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into corporeal possession in the Northwest quarter. This corporeal pos-
session of part of tract 1 gives X constructive possession of all of tract
1. Y later acquires title to tract 2 and enters into corporeal possession
of the tract from the Southeast quarter up to a fence which Y builds
across the Northwest quarter of tract 2, encroaching on the shaded area
claimed by both parties. Under the reasoning used by the Louisiana
courts,74 Y would prescribe up to the fence, but his constructive pos-
session beyond that point would not be sufficient to oust X's prior
constructive possession in the shaded area. Assuming that the fence is
factually sufficient to give notice to prior possessor X that Y is claiming
a part of X's land, 75 this author believes that Y should receive the
benefit of his constructive possession and, thus, oust X as to the shaded
area. Conversely, if Y had not corporeally encroached upon the shaded
area, X should be entitled to retain his chronologically senior possession
because Y has not provided notice of his adverse claim. Thus, absent
a corporeal encroachment, this comment is in accord with the existing
jurisprudence in affirming that an intangible constructive or civil pos-
session in itself cannot oust a prior possession. This analysis emphasises
the notice requirement.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 43-49.
75. This assumption should vary according to the circumstances of the case. For
instance, an encroachment sufficient to give notice as between two residential lots may
not be a sufficient encroachment as between two 1000 acre swampland tracts. See supra
note 66.
19851
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Conclusion
When two constructive possessions overlap onto the same tract of
land, or when a constructive possession overlaps with a civil possession,
or when two civil possessions overlap, the cases should be decided
according to the following framework:
1. If there is no corporeal possession by either party upon the
tract in conflict, the first possessor should retain possession unless the
second possessor can timely prove that he is the true owner.
Reasoning:
(a) Public policy in favor of title stability prohibits two contem-
poraneous possessions of the same land.
(b) A possessor is entitled to retain his land against adverse
claims until he is given notice of the adverse claim.
(c) No notice is given by an adverse constructive or civil pos-
session.
2. If one possessor has a corporeal possession which encroaches
on the tract in conflict and that possession is factually sufficient to give
notice, that possessor should be able to possess to the extent of his
title.
Reasoning:
(a) Corporeal encroachment can give notice that there is an
adverse claim to the land.
(b) A possessor who has received notice from a corporeal en-
croachment should be diligent in determining the extent of the
challenge to his possession and presumptive ownership.
John C. LaMaster
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